Abstract. Mutual authentication mechanisms can be used in RFID systems to preserve the confidentiality of the RFID tags. 
Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems enable the unique identification of an item with an embedded RFID tag. Making use of radio frequency based technology, RFID tags can be scanned in a non-line-of-sight manner and can be batch processed [19] . Hence, RFID systems facilitate a variety of applications such as, supply chain management, inventory tracking, building access control, and smart home appliances.
RFID systems consist of three main components: RFID tags, RFID readers, and a database. To obtain the ID from an RFID tag, the reader requests for the tag's ID. The tag responds with a quantity that can be uniquely associated with its ID. The reader looks up the tag's ID in the database to obtain related information such as a detailed description of the product carrying the RFID tag. Unlike bar codes, RFID tags are associated with a unique identifier that can be linked to the individual product, not only to the product type. Since every tag carries a unique ID, tracking individual tags is feasible via a relatively low-cost RFID reader, thus compromising the privacy of the tag and eventually of the owner of the product [16] . As an example, scanning parked cars with an RFID reader can reveal which one has more valuables inside. Furthermore, an individual can be tracked simply by tracking the ID of any RFID tag he/she carries.
To prevent tracking of the tag by its unique ID, the tag must respond only to queries originated by authorized parties (readers). Furthermore, readers must have a mechanism to verify that any response to their queries comes only from the valid tags. These properties can be guaranteed if the reader and the tag can mutually authenticate one another.
While the problem of mutual authentication has well known solutions for computationally capable devices [18] , it becomes particularly challenging in RFID systems due to the stringent hardware constraints of RFID tags. At present, a typical low-cost RFID tag has few thousands gates, in which only few hundreds of them can be dedicated to security [12] . Public Key Encryption (PKI) is beyond the computational power of the RFID tags due to the required exponentiations [12] . Even the symmetric encryption algorithms, like AES, typically require, on the order of, 20,000-30,000 gates [12] 1 , while cryptographic hash functions, such as SHA-1, are also too costly to be used in low-cost RFID tags [12] . In [1, 2] , Peris-Lopez et. al. have recently proposed two extremely lightweight protocols, called M 2 AP and EMAP, where tags were assumed to have minimal computational power able to perform only bitwise XOR (⊕), AND (∧), OR (∨), and modulo addition operations. The basic idea behind M 2 AP and EMAP is to use a temporary index-pseudonym (IDP ) to hide the tag ID when communicating with a reader. The tag responds to the reader queries with an IDP , that can be linked to the tag's unique ID only by authorized readers. Our contributions.
In this paper, we analyze two lightweight mutual authentication protocols [1, 2] , called M 2 AP and EMAP. We show how an adversary eavesdropping on the wireless channel can breach the confidentiality of the communication by extracting the tag's unique ID. Our attack model does not require the ability to modify the contents of transmitted messages, nor does it require the ability to actively probe tags; simple bitwise operations are sufficient to extract the unique ID of the tag. We provide probabilistic analysis of our attacks on both protocols and show that the problem of extracting the tag's ID can be mapped to a set cover problem. Our mapping shows that the number of protocol runs needed to extract the tag's unique ID is logarithmic in the length of the ID. Our attacks are passive and require eavesdropping of only O(log 2 L) protocol runs, as opposed to the active attacks presented in [3, 4] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we state our assumptions. In Section 3, we describe the M 2 AP and EMAP mutual authentication protocols. In Section 4, we describe attacks against the M 2 AP and EMAP, and provide probabilistic analysis of our passive attacks against them. In Section 5, we present related work. We present our conclusions Section 6.
Adversarial Model
We assume a passive adversary able to eavesdrop on messages exchanged between legitimate RFID tag-reader pairs. We also assume that the adversary can store the messages it observes. Although a passive adversary is close to the weakest adversary one can have, our adversary, however, is a rather weak adversary as it only requires the ability to perform simple bit-wise operations and modulo additions. We do not consider an active adversary able to probe tags as in [3, 4] . In the M 2 AP protocol [1] , each tag stores three quantities: the tag's secret unique ID, an IDP , and a secret key K=K 1 K 2 K 3 K 4 , where denotes the concatenation operation. For each tag, the IDP and secret key K are stored in the database. The tag's unique ID is static while the IDP and the key K are updated after every successful mutual authentication run. As a mutual authentication run, or protocol run, we define the execution of the following steps that lead to the mutual authentication of the reader-tag pair and the update of the IDP and K.
STEP 1:
Tag interrogation-Initially, the reader sends a 'hello' message to the tag which responds with its current IDP . Using the IDP , the reader retrieves the key K from the database.
STEP 2:
Reader authentication-After receiving the IDP , and retrieving K, the reader generates two fresh random numbers (nonces), n 1 and n 2 , and forwards the following three messages, A, B, and C in the clear, to the tag:
Upon receiving A, B, and C, the tag extracts the nonce n 1 from A as n 1 = A ⊕ IDP ⊕ K 1 , and authenticates the reader by checking that B = (IDP ∧ K 2 ) ∨ n 1 . If authentication of B fails, the tag does not respond to the reader.
STEP 3:
Tag authentication-After the reader has been authenticated, the tag extracts the nonce n 2 from message C as n 2 = C − IDP − K 3 , and generates two messages, D and E, as follows:
The reader authenticates the tag, by checking that D = (IDP ∨ K 4 ) ∧ n 2 .
STEP 4:
ID extraction-The reader extracts the tag's unique ID from the message E as ID = (E ⊕ n 1 ) − IDP .
STEP 5:
IDP and key updating-The reader and the tag update the IDP and K as follows: 
The updated IDP and K are mutually stored for the next protocol run.
The EMAP Mutual Authentication Protocol
EMAP follows the same five steps described in M 2 AP, with the only difference being the way that messages B, C, D, and E are generated and how the IDP and K are updated. In EMAP, the messages A, B, C, D, and E are generated as follows:
The updating of the IDP and K works as follows:
where F p (x) is the 24-bit sequence representing the parity of every 4 bit block of x.
Passive Attacks Against M 2 AP and EMAP

Passive Attack Against M 2 AP
In this section, we show how an adversary can extract the tag's unique ID by observing, on average, a logarithmic (in the length of ID) number of mutual authentication runs between the tag and the reader. To obtain the ID, the adversary needs to observe only the IDP , B, and E message exchange in each protocol run. For clarity, we first illustrate the attack via an example. Then, we show that the problem of extracting the tag's ID can be mapped to a set covering problem. Based on our mapping, we provide a probabilistic analysis of our attack.
Example: For clarity, we only show the values of the messages observed by the adversary that are relevant to the attack. Assume that the unique ID of an RFID tag is six bit long and is '001100'. Initially, the reader broadcasts a "hello" message to announce its presence. The tag challenges the reader by sending its current IDP (1) = 101100. The reader looks up the database to find the corresponding secret key K (1) , generates two random numbers (n
2 ), and challenges the tag with A C (1) , where B (1) = 011000. After the reader is authenticated, the tag responds with D (1) E (1) , where E (1) = 101000. Notice that, from message B in equation (1) 
1 = * 1 * * 00, and substituting into (2) we get:
From the first protocol run, the adversary identifies the two least significant bits of the tag's ID as '00' using (10) . In the next protocol run, the adversary gathers the quantities IDP (2) = 010001, B (2) = 111001, and E (2) = 100100. Using B in equation (1), the adversary computes n
1 = 0 * 110 * , and a second equation for the tag's ID can be constructed:
Substituting the two least significant bits '00' in (11), the adversary can compute ID = * * 1100. By substituting ' * * 1100' back in (10), the adversary identifies the fifth bit of the ID as '0', and substituting the five known bits of the ID back in (11), the adversary identifies the tag's unique ID as '001100'. Figure 2 presents the protocol exchanges for the two instances of mutual authentication between the tag and the reader in our example. Let
denote the first term of the right hand side in (10) and let (m) i denote the i th bit of message m. Note from our example that (
The set of equations, similar to (10) and (11), constructed by the adversary by observing protocol runs, can be solved for the ID if (x (n) ) i is known for at least one n. This condition is equivalent to (IDP (n) ) i = 0 for at least one n. That is, each position of the observed IDP 's has a zero in at least one IDP . In turn, this observation can be mapped to a variant of the set cover problem expressed in the following lemma. 
For each bit of the ID we can write
where
denotes the carry from the modulo 2 addition in (12) . To compute the carry C i , we must know (ID) i−1 from the LSB up to the (i − 1) th bit. For the LSB, C 1 = 0 and hence, (ID) 1 can be extracted from any S (n) with 1 ∈ S (n) . Once (ID) 1 has been extracted, using (13) , (x (n) ) 1 can be extracted for all n. Therefore, using (14), C 2 can be extracted for all n. Now, equation (13) , can be used to solve for (ID) 2 from any S (n) with 2 ∈ S (n) . Since for all i ∈ [1 : L], there exists an S (n)
with i ∈ S (n) , one can recursively solve for the tag's ID from the least significant to the most significant bits.
Given that the bit values of the IDP are drawn from a probability distribution, we can compute the average number of protocol runs required to recover the unique ID using the following lemma. 
Moreover, given any ∈ (0, 1), the number of mutual authentication runs an eavesdropper has to observe in order to extract the ID with probability at least 1 − is given by:
Proof. The proof of lemma 2 is provided in the appendix.
From lemma 2, we observe that the probability of extracting the ID of the tag is a monotonically increasing function of the number of observed protocol runs m, converging to 1. Lemma 2 also specifies how many protocol runs one must eavesdrop, before the entire ID can be extracted, with a desired probability. In Figure 3 (a), we show the probability of extracting the ID of the tag as a function of the number of protocol runs observed, for different values of L and for p = 1 2 . We now compute the average number of protocol runs an adversary needs to eavesdrops to extract the tag's ID.
Lemma 3. Let p be the probability of any bit of the IDP being 1, and let L be the length of the IDP . Let m denote the number of protocol runs needed to extract the tag's unique ID. Then, the expected value of m is:
Proof. The proof of lemma 3 is provided in the appendix.
For L = 96 and p = 1 2 as specified in [1] , the expected number of protocol runs needed to extract the tag's unique ID is 7.9252. Figure 3 (b) shows the analytically derived relation between the expected number of protocol runs needed to extract the tag's ID and the length of the ID. We observe that E[m] grows linearly with the logarithm of the ID length L. 
Passive Attack Against EMAP
In EMAP [2] , a particular emphasis is put on the properties of message E in equation (4), due to the fact that the tag's unique ID is extracted via E [2] . However, the ID is also used in equations (6) - (9) for the key updating. Therefore, an adversary can extract the tag's ID using equations (6) - (9), without breaking message E. Let S 0 denote the set of indexes where the bits of the IDP are 0 and S 1 denote the set of indexes where the bits of the IDP are 1, that is,
The attack against EMAP consists of the following steps:
Step 1: From message B in equation (3), we have (
, where b denotes the complement of the bit b.
Step 2: Message A in equation (3) has two unknowns, namely, the secret key K 1 and the nonce n 1 . The partial information about n 1 obtained from Step 1 can be substituted in (3) to extract bits of K 1 ,
Step 3: From the message D in equation (4), we have (
Step 4: Equation (5) has two unknowns, the secret key K 1 and the nonce n 2 .
The partial information about n 2 obtained in Step 3 can be substituted in (5) to extract bits of K 1 as follows:
Up to this point, the adversary knows (K 1 ) i , ∀i ∈ S 1 from (20), and (K 1 ) i , ∀i ∈ S 0 from (21). Hence, the secret key K 1 has been fully extracted.
Step 5: By substituting K 1 into (3) and (5), the adversary obtains n 1 and n 2 as shown below:
Step 6: By eavesdropping the next protocol run, the adversary can extract the updated value K in (6), the first half of the tag's unique ID is revealed:
Step 7: From messages B and D in equations (3) and (4) respectively, (
Therefore, in every protocol run, the bits of K 2 corresponding to the zero bits of IDP are known, and the bits of K 4 corresponding to the one bits of IDP are known. Thus,
) i are known and, hence, using equation (7),
) i are known, and using equation (9),
Using (24) and (25), the second half bits of the ID are extracted if two consecutive IDP 's have the same bit value in that position. Hence, the adversary can solve for each bit in the second half of the ID depending on the value of the IDP 's in its position. Lemma 4 analyzes the performance of our passive attack against EMAP.
Lemma 4.
Let p be the probability of any bit of the IDP being 1, and let L be the length of the IDP . Then, the probability of fully disclosing the tag's unique ID by observing m consecutive mutual authentication runs, is given by:
Moreover, given any ∈ (0, 1), the number of consecutive mutual authentication runs an eavesdropper has to observe to extract the entire static ID with probability at least 1 − is given by:
Furthermore, the average number of consecutive mutual authentication runs needed to extract the tag's unique ID is given by:
Proof. In our attack, no information about the ID can be extracted by just eavesdropping the first protocol run. However, by eavesdropping two consecutive protocol runs, the adversary is guaranteed to recover the first half of the ID (Steps 1-6 ). For the second half of the ID, bits are recovered probabilistically by solving the update equation of K 2 or K 4 (Step 7). When two consecutive IDP 's have the same value in one bit position, the adversary can solve for the bit of the ID at that position. That is, for the i th bit of ID, the adversary will successfully solve for its value if (IDP (n) ) i = (IDP (n+1) ) i , i.e. both are 0 or 1 which occur with probabilities (1 − p) 2 and p 2 , respectively. This means that the probability of successfully solving for each bit of the second half of the ID is given by (1 − p) 2 + p 2 . Also note that, to extract all bits of the second half of the ID, a match between two consecutive IDP s has to occur, ∀i ∈ [
Hence, the problem of extracting all second half ID bits, can be mapped to the same set covering problem expressed in Lemma 1, with a different success probability, and ID length equal to L 2 . Following the same analysis as in Lemma 2 and 3, we can compute the quantities in (26), (27), and (28) by substituting the success probability for
Note that at least two protocol runs are needed to extract useful information and, hence, 1 is added to the expressions in (27), and (28).
In Figure 4 
Related Work
The problem of mutual authentication in RFID systems has been studied under different constraints [1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14] . Juels and Pappu have suggested the use of a public key cryptosystem to solve the problem of consumer privacy in RFID banknotes [9] . Avoine, however, described possible limitations on the security of the protocol in [11] . Feldhofer et.al. proposed the use of AES symmetric key cipher to achieve mutual authentication between tags and readers for tags able to perform AES Encryption/Decryption [10] . Weis et.al. described privacy and security risks for RFID systems and proposed solutions based on one way hash functions [12] . Juels proposed the use of a pool of pseudonyms for each tag to protect the privacy of the tag's ID [8] .
Vajda and Buttyan proposed lightweight cryptographic primitives for tag authentication based on simple bitwise operations [14] . In [6] , Juels and Weis proposed HB + , a lightweight authentication protocol based on the human-tocomputer authentication protocol designed by Hopper and Blum [5] . The security proof of the HB + against active attacks was based on the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem. Gilbert et.al., however, showed a linear time active attack on the HB + protocol [7] . In [1, 2] [4] . Their attack relies on active probing of the tag via rogue reader.
Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed the problem of mutual authentication in RFID systems. We analyzed M 2 AP and EMAP, two lightweight mutual authentication protocols and showed how a passive adversary can extract the tag's unique ID by observing, on average, a logarithmic (in the length of the ID) number of protocol runs. We provided a probabilistic analysis of our attacks by mapping the problem of extracting the tag's ID to a set covering problem.
Then, if the probability of any bit of M (i) being 1 is equal to p, we get
Proof of Lemma 2
From equation (31) and by independence of bits, we get:
Therefore, for any > 0, we have: Pr
where in equation (34) we sum over all possible number of zeros in S (i−1) . But,
because for all bits where S (i−1) k = 1, M (i) k = 0 to satisfy X i = 1. Equation (34) can be shown as follows: From (30), the probability of a single bit in S (i−1) to be equal to 1 is p i−1 . Therefore, by independence, the probability of having L − j ones in S (i−1) is given by:
Similarly, from (31), the probability of any single bit of S (i−1) to be equal to 0 is 1 − p i−1 and, hence, Pr(S (i−1) has j zeros) = (1 − p i−1 ) j .
Finally, there are L j different ways of choosing the positions of the j zeros. Thus, by combining (36) and (37), the probability of having exactly j zeros in S (i−1) can be written as:
From ( (
Hence, the expected number of messages required is:
and the lemma follows.
